Bail (Section 437 Cr.P.C
AIR 2001SC 1444 = 2001(2)PLJR205SC
Prahlad Singh Bhati Vs NCT Delhi
Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs Rajesh Ranjan
Section 438 Cr.P.C
An interim order restraining arrest, if
passed while dealing with an application u/s 438 Cr.P.C will
amount to interference in the investigation, which can not,
at any rate be done u/s 438 of the Code.
AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 1057 1057 1057 1057
Adri Dharan Das v. State of West Bengal
Common object & Common
"Common object" is
different from a 'common intention' as it does not require a
prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack.
It is enough if each has the same object in view and their
number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to
achieve that object. The 'common object' of an assembly is to be
ascertained from the acts and language of the members composing
it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding
circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct
adopted by the members of the assembly. What the common object
of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the
incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined,
keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by
the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the
scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in all
cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the
same must be translated into action or be successful.
AIR 2005 S.C. 1096
Sunil Kumar v. State of
Compoundation- even if an offence is not compoundable within the scope of Section 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure the Court may, in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, reduce the sentence imposed while maintaining the conviction.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2015 OF 2008
(SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO.4483 of 2008)
Puttaswamy Vs State of Karnataka & Another
Judgment Of Hon'ble SC dated 11 December, 2008
Inquest (Section 174 Cr P C)
The Section does not
contemplate that the manner in which the incident took place
or the names of the accused should be mentioned in the
inquest report. The basic purpose of holding an inquest is
to report regarding the apparent cause of death, namely
whether it is suicidal, homicidal, accidental or by some
S.C. 1164 = 2003 SCC(Cri) 641
v. Balwinder Singh
That the object the
proceedings under Section 174 is merely to ascertain whether
a person has died under suspicious circumstances or an
unnatural death and if so what is the apparent cause of the
death. The question regarding the details as to how the
deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him or under what
circumstances he was assaulted appears to us to be foreign
to the ambit and scope of the proceedings under S. 174. In
these circumstances, therefore, neither in practice nor in
law was it necessary for the police to have mentioned these
details in the inquest report.
AIR 1975 S.C. 1252 = 1975
Podda Narayana v. State of
2010(4) SCC(Cri) 11
Aqeel Ahmad Vs State of UP
2008(1)SCC(Crl)440, Sakiri Basu Vs State of UP
Held-----Law does not mandate taking prior permission from magistrate for further investigation, which is statutory right of police. However re-investigation or fresh investigation without permission is prohibited.
2009(3) PLJR 45 SC
2009(4) PLJR 189; 2008(3) PLJR 367 SC; 2009(1) PLJR 111
Held----- A person can not be tried for the same offence twice.
2009() PLJR 8
2004 SCC (Crl) 39;
2007(3)SCC (Crl) 388
Held----- Detention of accused at the time of hearing was legal and by the order of competent court and hence he can not be given relief (habeas corpus) on the basis of illegal remand.
2009(3) PLJR 296
Relied- AIR 1971SC62; 1974Cr.L.J 465; 2008(3) PLJR216
Distiguished - 2005(1) PLJR 117; 2008(3) PLJR 147;
2008(2) BLJ 135
Revision(Section 397-399 Cr.P.C.
2002(1)PLJR 708 Patna HC
Arvind Singh Vs State
Release of seized Property
Custody and disposal of vehicles seized in
accidents. Guide lines.
General Insurance Council & Ors Vs State of
General Insurance Council & Ors Vs State of
Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai Vs State of Gujrat
Section 88 Cr.P.C.
Section 88 Cr.P.C is an enabling section
which vests a discretion in the magistrate to exercise power
under the said section asking the person to execute a bond for
appearance only in bailable cases or in trival cases and it can
not be resorted to in a case of serious offence.
2000(2)PLJR 686 Pat HC(DB)
Section 105A – 105L and 166A & 166B Cr.P.C.
These provisions are not ordinary law of land
and are applicable only to offences which have international
remifications. The are not applicable for the offences which are
local in nature and committed within state.
State of MP Vs Balram Mihani & ors
The pivotal question
is applicability of Section 149, IPC. Said provision has its
foundation on constructive liability which is the sine qua non
for its operation. The emphasis is on the common object and not
on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly
cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object
and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one
of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an
unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be
convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to
determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more
persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of
the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be
laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt
act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of
unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of such
an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have
understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to
commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section
141. The word 'object' means the purpose or design and, in order
to make it 'common', it must be shared by all. In other words,
the object should be common to the persons, who compose the
assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and
concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement
after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It
may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the
assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once
formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified
or altered or abandoned at any stage.
AIR 2005 S.C. 1096
Sunil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan
Section 149, IPC
consists of two parts. The first part of the section means that
the offence to be committed in prosecution of the common object
must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the
common object. In order that the offence may fall within the
first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the
common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was
member. Even if the offence committed is not in direct
prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet
fall under Section 141, if it can be held that the offence was
such as the members knew was likely to be committed and this is
what is required in the second part of the section. The purpose
for which the members of the assembly set out or desired to
achieve is the object. If the object desired by all the members
is the same, the knowledge that is the object which is being
pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general
agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the
common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the
human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct
evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to
be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard and fast rule can be laid down under
the circumstances from which the common object can be culled
out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of the
assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at the time of or before
or after the occurrence. The word 'knew' used in the second limb
of the section implies something more than a possibility and it
cannot be made to bear the sense of 'might have been known'.
Positive knowledge is necessary. When an offence is committed in
prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an
offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was
likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object.
That, however, does not make the converse proposition true;
there may be cases which would come within the second part but
not within the first part. The distinction between the two parts
of Section 149 cannot be ignored or obliterated.
AIR 2005 S.C. 1096
Sunil Kumar v. State of
Section 154 Cr.P.C.
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
Section 156(3) provides for a check by the
Magistrate on the police performing its duties under Chapter
XII, Cr.P.C. In cases where the Magistrate finds that the
police has not done its duty of investigating the case at
all, or has not done it satisfactorily, he can issue a
direction to the police to do the investigation properly,
and can monitor thesame
although Section 156(3) is very briefly worded, there is an
implied power in the Magistrate under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C.
to order registration of a criminal offence and/or to direct
the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station to
hold a proper investigation and take all such necessary
steps that may be necessary for ensuring a proper
investigation including monitoring the same. Even though
these powers have not been expressly mentioned in Section
156(3), Cr.P.C., we are of the opinion that they are implied
in the above provision.
AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 907
Sakiri Vasu v. State of U. P.
The learned Magistrate
directed carrying out of an investigation by the
investigating officer and submit a report to it. If an
investigation was to be carried out in terms of Section
156(3) of the Code, the same could not have been equated
with an enquiry as the two expressions have differently been
defined in Section 3(h) and 3(i) of the Code. In any event,
the learned Magistrate did not have any jurisdiction to
recall the said order.
Dharmeshbhai Vasudevbhai vs State Of Gujarat And Ors, SC on 5
Section 167 Cr.P.C.
Within the first 15 days of arrest, the
magistrate may remand the accused either to judicial custody
or police custody for given number of days. But once the
period of 15 days expires, the magistrate can not pass
orders for police remand.
Devendra Kumar Vs State of Haryana and other
2001(1)PCCR 128 SC
On expiry of the period specified in
paragraph (a) of proviso to sub-section (2) of S. 167 if the
accused files an application for bail and offers also to
furnish the bail, on being directed, then it has to be held
that the accused has availed of his indefeasible right.
AIR 2001 S.C. 1910 = 2001 AIR SCW 1500
Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra
Section 190 Cr.P.C
2005 SCC (Crl) 1697
Section 195 Cr.P.C
2005(4)SCC(cri)1101 Para 33
Iqbal Singh Marwah Vs Meenakshi Marwah
Sachidanand Singh and anor Vs State of Bihar
Section 197 Cr.P.C
The relevant time, as held in S.A. Venkataraman Vs. State
(AIR 1958 SC 107), is the date on which the cognizance is
taken. If on that date, the appellant is not a public
servant, there will be no question of any sanction. If he
continues to be a public servant but in a different capacity
or holding a different office than the one which is alleged
to have been abused, still there will be no question of
Singh Chautala vs C.B.I.
2011(3) SCC(Cri) 1 = 2011(7) SCC 141
2001(1)PLJR 15 Patna HC
Section 202 Cr.P.C
In enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C, the accused has no
right to take part in proceeding nor has the magistrate any
jurisdiction to permit him to do so. It would not be open to
magistrate to put any question to witnesses at the instance
of the person named as accused but against whom process has
not been issued, nor can he examine any witnesses at the
instance of such person...This does not mean that he is
precluded from being present when an enquiry is held by a
magistrate. He may remain present either in person or
through a counsel or agent with a view to be informed of
what is going on.
AIR 1963SC1430 para 7
Chandradeo Singh Vs Prakash Chandra Bose
2004 SCC(Cri)1077 para 9
Sheojee Singh Vs Nagendra Tiwari & others
Section 205 Cr.P.C
- Section 205 Cr.P.C.- Principles, case law discussed with illustrative instances.
2009(4) PLJR 329
- Section 205 Cr.P.C – offence under the provisions of NDPS Act are serious in nature. Exemption u/s 205 can not be granted.
2009(3) PLJR 673
Section 227 Cr.P.C.
The 'ground' in the context (of section
227Cr.P.C) is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for
but putting the accused on trial.... The court therefore
need not undertake an elaborate inquiry in shifting and
weighing the materials. Nor is it necessary to delve deep
into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is
whether the evidenciary material on record, if generally
accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the
Section 227-228 Cr.P.C.
Reading the two provisions together in
juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear
that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the
truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously
judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable
defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge
at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and
weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved,
would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or
not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be
finally applied before recording a finding regarding the
guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be
applied at the stage of deciding the matter under S. 227 or
S. 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see
whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the
accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his
Strong suspicion against the accused,
if the matter remains in the region of suspicion,
cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the
conclusion of the trial. But at the
initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the
Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence then it is
not open to the Court to say that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
If the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the
accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in
cross-examination or rebutted by the
defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
comitted the offence, then there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial.
We may just illustrate the difference
of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to
the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like
even at the conclusion of the trial,
then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end
in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the
initial stage of making an order under
S. 227 or S. 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and
generally the order which will have to be made will be one
under S. 228 and not under S. 227.
AIR 1977 SUPREME COURT 2018
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh
Section 228 Cr.P.C.
2001(1)PCCR 244 SC
sudhir and others Vs State of MP
Section 233(3) Cr.P.C.
The power to summon any witness or recall and
re-examine any person already examined is the discretionary
power of the court, in case such evidence appears to it to
be essential for a just decision of the case... The
provision of sub-section 3 of section 233 can not be
understood as compelling the attendance of any prosecution
witness examined, cross-examined and discharged, to be
juxtaposed as a defence witness.
When such frivolous and vexatious petitions are filed, a
judge is not powerless. He should have used his
discretionary power and should have refused relief on the
ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay
or for defeating the ends of justice.
2010(2) SCC(Crl)1318: C.Magesh & Ors Vs State of
Section 258 Cr.P.C.
Section 293 Cr.P.C.
2005(1)PLJR 79 SC Para 6
Section 311 Cr.P.C.
The section(old section 540) is in two parts.
The first part gives a discretionary power but the later
part is mandatory. The use of the word 'may' in the first
part and of the word 'shall' in the second part firmly
establishes this difference. Under the first part which is
permissive, the court act in one of the three ways (a)
Summon any person as witness (b) examine any person present
in court although not summoned and (c) recall or re-examine
any witness already examined.
The second part is obligatory and compels the court to act
in these three ways or any one of them, if the just decision
of the case demands it.
As the section stands, there is no limitation on the power
of the court arising from the stage to which the trial may
have reached provided the court is bona-fide of the opinion
that for just decision of the case, the step must be taken.
It is clear that the requirement of just decision of the
case does not limit the action to something in the interest
of accused only. The action may equally benefit the
AIR 1968 SC 178
Jamatraj Kewalji Govani v. State of Maharashtr
- Section 311 – Expression 'evidence' employed in the section would mean material evidence and would not include documentary evidence.
2009(4) PLJR 176 ; 2007(1) PLJR 216
Section 319 Cr.P.C.
For invocking section 319 Cr.P.C, the court
must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already
collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other
person has committed an offence. Second is that for such
offence, that other person could as well be tried along with
the already arraigned accused.
But even then, what is conferred on the court is only a
discretion as could be discerned from the word “the court
may proceed against such person.” The discretionary power so
conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal
justice....It must be remembered that there is no compelling
duty on the court to proceed against other person.
Unless the court is hopeful that there is reasonable
prospect of the case as against the newly brought accused
ending in conviction of the offence concerned, we would say
that the court should refrain from adopting such a recourse
2000 S.C.Cr.R. 445
Michael Machado and other Vs CBT & Other
The mandate of the law of fresh trial is mandatory whereas
mandate that newly added accused could be tried to-gather
with the accused is directory.
'Could be' can not, under these circumstances be held to be
2002 Cr.L.J. 2806 SC
Shashikant Singh Vs Tarkeshwar Singh
Person arrayed as an accused in a complaint
case, if not summoned by the magistrate to face trial at the
stage of taking cognizance after conducting an enquiry u/s
202 Cr.P.C, go out of reach of section 319 Cr.P.C. as they
do not fall within term “not being the accused”
2009(3) PLJR 382
2004(2) PLJR 225
AIR 1990 SC 2158
2009(3) PLJR 399
AIR 1983 SC 67
- Section 319 – Person arrayed as accused in a complaint case, if not summoned by magistrate to face trial at the stage of taking cognizance after conducting an enquiry u/s 202 Cr.P.C. go out of reach of section 319 Cr.P.C as he does not fall within the term “not being accused”
2009(3) PLJR 382
Relied- AIR 1990 SC 2158
- Section 319 – A person who has been dropped by the police during investigation is “person not being accused” and he may be summoned u/s 319 Cr.P.C. if evidence against him comes during trial.
2009(3) PLJR 399
Relied- AIR 1983 SC 67
- Section 319 Cr.P.C. - Unless the court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly brought accused ending in conviction of the offence concerned, the court should refrain from sommoning u/s 319 Cr.P.C.
2000(3)SCC 262 Michael Machadeo and another Vs CBI and another
Section 320 Cr.P.C
Offence u/s 324 IPC committed before
amendment in 320 Cr.P.C. The amendment will be prospective and
the said offence u/s 324 IPC is compoundable.
Hira bhai Jhaver bhai Vs State of
Section 321 Cr.P.C.
Section 321 Cr.P.C contemplates consent by
the court in a supervisory and not an adjudicatory manner. What
the court must ensure is that the application for withdrawal has
been properly made , after independent consideration by the
public prosecutor and in furtherance of public interest.
2001 SCC(Cri) 59ri) 59
Sheonandan Paswan Vs State of
Section 357 Cr.P.C
Compensation u/s 357 may be awarded to victim
even without imposing fine.
Before awarding compensation u/s 357 Cr.P.C, opportunity of
being heard should be given to accused.
2004 SCC (Cri) 1085) 1085
Sentence of imprisonment can be granted for
default in payment of compensation awarded u/s 357(3) Cr.P.C
Section 464 Cr.P.C.
In view of S. 464, Cr. P.C., it is possible
for the appellate or revisional Court to convict an accused
for an offence for which no charge was framed unless the
Court is of the opinion that a failure of justice would in
fact occasion. In order to judge whether a failure of
justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine
whether the accused was aware of the basic ingredients of
the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the
main facts sought to be established against him were
explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to
AIR 2004 SUPREME COURT 1990
Dalbir Singh v. State of U.P.
Section 468 Cr.P.C.